Darwinian Evolution on the Axis of the Crisis of Induction: Popper’s Falsifiability Principle and the Question of Scientificity

Abstract

One of the most influential 20th-century philosophers of science, Sir Karl R. Popper challenged the dominant induction-based conception of science by proposing the principle of falsifiability in his 1934 work The Logic of Scientific Discovery. According to Popper, no logical path exists leading from particular propositions to universal ones, as has been known since Hume, and this crisis of induction undermines the methodological foundations of modern science. In response, Popper established falsifiability as the criterion of scientificity and began comparing this principle with the Darwinian theory of evolution from the 1960s onwards. While Popper drew two analogies (i.e., methodological and epistemic) between his conception of science and evolutionary theory, he also characterized that same theory as a metaphysical research program. This tension has been further argued to extend beyond physics and biology, raising parallel methodological questions for the social sciences with particular regard to the epistemological legitimacy of macro-sociological theories. This study situates this tension within the intellectual context of the crisis of induction and examines both the internal consistency of Popper’s views on evolutionary theory and the question of scientificity that follows from them.